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United States Constitutional Provisions 





The opinion of the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Carolina 
is unreported but may be found on pages 27-29 of the appellate record. (R. at 27-29). The 
opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventeenth Circuit Court is likewise 
unreported but may be found at page 32-34 of the appellate record (R. at 32-34). 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
 The court of appeals entered judgment on February 1, 2013. (R. at 34). Petitioner filed his 
petition for writ of certiorari on February 7, 2013. (R. at 36). This Court granted the petition on 
May 20, 2013. (R. at 37). This Court’s jurisdiction rests on 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) (2012). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 A district court’s fact findings and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from them are 
reviewed for clear error. Its legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION 
The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution states: 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the 
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of 










STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Martin County is located in the State of West Carolina. (R. at 11). The Martin County 
Board is comprised of five elected members serving staggered four-year terms. (R. at 10). In 
keeping with national custom, the Martin County Board maintains the practice of beginning each 
public legislative session with an invocation delivered by member of a local clergy. (R. at 18). 
The prayer-giver selection process is wholly inclusive and welcoming by allowing the prayer-
givers to volunteer to deliver the invocations by self-selection. (R. at 10 & 18). The Martin 
County Board encourages any congregation or religious group in the community to participate in 
the invocation practice, and Martin County Board assumes no involvement or control in the 
content of the invocations delivered at the public session. (R. at 18). The resulting invocations 
featured diverse references to various religious beliefs, though many briefly contained specific 
Christian tenets consistent with the character of religious congregations in Martin County. (R. at 
28). On some occasions prior to the delivery of the invocation, the Board offered a simple 
request that attendees stand throughout the invocation and subsequent formalities. (R. at 2-5).  
Respondent, Anne Dhaliwal, hereinafter referred to as “Dhaliwal,” resident of Martin 
County and the State of West Carolina, is a practicing Sikh and regular attendee of the Martin 
County Board meetings. (R. at 7 & 9). Despite having participated for months without complaint, 
Dhaliwal and her husband have requested that the Martin County Board discontinue its 
adherence to this historically accepted national tradition of legislative invocation. (R. at 20 & 
28). Dhaliwal cites offense at the amount of Christian religious leaders delivering the 
invocations, as well as offense to the Judeo-Christian references included in the invocations. (R. 
at 14). Though Dhaliwal is certainly welcome to participate in delivering a legislative invocation 
on behalf of the Sikh faith, Ms. Dhaliwal’s statements and correspondence did not express any 
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such interest; nevertheless, Mrs. Dhaliwal has levied a claim that her religion has not been 
represented in the legislative invocation process. (R. at 9 & 14). Dhaliwal asserts that these 
factors amount to a violation of the Establishment Clause by demonstrating a preference for a 
religion to which she does not subscribe, and has caused her offense. (R. at 19). 
Dhaliwal’s complaint to the Northern District Court of West Carolina sought, among 
other relief, to compel Martin County to censor the content of the invocations delivered before 
the legislative meeting. (R. at 14-15). The district court determined that no relief could be 
granted on this claim, reasoning that the prayer practice in Martin County had not infringed upon 
the religious freedom of its citizens. (R. at 28-29). This ruling was reversed and remanded by the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventeenth Circuit. (R. at 33). The United States 
Supreme Court granted the Petition for Writ of Certiorari by Martin County on May 20, 2013. 
(R. at 37-38). Martin County now respectfully requests this Court uphold the constitutionality of 
Martin County’s legislative invocation practice. (R. at 35). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
I. 
 The Supreme Court in Marsh established the leading inquiry into the constitutionality of 
a legislative prayer practice. The Seventeenth Circuit adopted a legal standard from the Second 
Circuit’s opinion in Galloway, which is inconsistent with the standard established by the 
Supreme Court in Marsh. In Marsh, this Court created a limited inquest into the prayer practice 
to determine whether the prayer opportunity had been exploited to proselytize or advance a 
single religion, or to disparage any other. The two questions considered by this Courtin Marsh 
were: 1) whether the governing body selected the prayer-giver by result of an impermissible 
motive; and 2) whether the prayer practice had been exploited to proselytize or advance a single 
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religion, or to disparage any other. The Galloway court exceeds the limits prescribed by this 
Court in Marsh by examining individual aspects of the prayer practice together in totality, 
regardless of the presence of any impermissible motive or evidence that the prayer opportunity 
had been exploited. The totality of circumstances standard in Galloway is an unduly harsh 
guideline that results in an effective prohibition of legislative prayer. To require broad and 
complete diversity among faiths would be realistically unachievable and unduly burdensome for 
the majority of our Nation’s local councils and legislatures. Furthermore, requiring wholly 
nonsectarian invocations would amount to establishing an unconstitutional civic religion or an 
endorsement of a vague theism. The Supreme Court in Marsh and our Nation’s founders did not 
envision such effective prohibition as is essentially required by the standard in Galloway. 
II. 
 The prayer practice in Martin County is permissible under Marsh and the Establishment 
Clause because Martin County has neither exploited the prayer opportunity to advance, 
proselytize, or disparage any religion, nor utilized any impermissible motive in the selection of 
the prayer-givers. Without proof of exploitation or an impermissible motive, the prayer practice 
and the content of the invocations must not be subjected to any rigorous judicial scrutiny.  
Alternatively, the Martin County prayer practice should still be permissible under the standard 
employed in Galloway, provided that standard is still limited to the prayer opportunity 
exploitation and impermissible motive threshold required by this Court in Marsh. 
Further, Martin County does not exercise any control over the prayer content, or review 
the prayer content prior to delivery. Exercising a police role over the content of the invocations 
would represent an unconstitutional establishment of religion by the governing authority. 
Additionally, Martin County does not prohibit any person or religious congregation from 
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delivering the legislative invocation. As a result, there is not sufficient evidence present to 
controvert realities and practicalities of the invocational practice in Martin County; therefore, 
there are no sufficient grounds available to render Martin County’s invocational practice 
unconstitutional. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE SEVENTEENTH CIRCUIT APPLIED AN INCORRECT LEGAL STANDARD 
 
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting 
the free exercise thereof.” U.S. Const. amend. 1. This Court addressed the relationship between 
the Establishment Clause and legislative invocations in Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) 
to determine whether the practice had violated the Establishment Clause by affiliating the 
Nebraska State Legislature with the Christian religion. Id. at 784. Absent indication that a given 
prayer practice has been exploited to proselytize or advance a single religion, or to disparage any 
other, and lacking evidence of an impermissible motive in the selection of the prayer-giver, this 
Court reasoned that such a legislative prayer practice would not violate the Establishment 
Clause. Id. at 794-95. In light of this Nation’s continuous and persistent history of utilizing 
legislative invocations, this Court concluded that the prayer practice implemented by the 
Nebraska State Legislature had not violated the Establishment Clause. Id. at 792.  
In Galloway v. Town of Greece, 681 F.3d 20 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 
2388 (2013), however, the Second Circuit considered whether the town board’s legislative prayer 
practice, measured in its totality according to a reasonable observer, created an appearance that 
the town disfavored or gave preference to certain religious faiths. Id. at 29. The Second Circuit 
inquired as to three elements to be viewed in the totality of circumstances: 1) the prayer-giver 
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selection process; 2) the content of the invocations; and 3) the contextual actions of the prayer-
givers and board members with regard to the invocations. Id. at 30. The court determined that the 
particular prayer practice in the Town of Greece violated the Establishment Clause because the 
predominance of Christian prayer-givers, the presence of sectarian content in the prayers, and the 
contextual actions of the prayer-givers and board members would impress upon a reasonable 
observer the notion that town is affiliated with Christianity. Id. at 30-34. This test established by 
the Second Circuit exceeds the bounds of this Court’s standard in Marsh, wherein this Court 
declined to embark on a sensitive review of the prayer content and rejected the primary effects 
prong set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971), which was analogous to the 
reasonable observer requirement outlined in Galloway. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 795; see also Lynch v. 
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679 (1984) (noting this Court’s refusal to apply the Lemon test in 
Marsh). Any standard such as that employed by the Seventeenth Circuit is necessarily incorrect 
because unwarranted incursions into the content of the prayers and the contextual effects are 
impermissible, according to this Court in Marsh, and unconstitutional as a result. Marsh, 463 
U.S. at 794. 
A. Marsh provides the controlling standard acknowledging the constitutionality of 
sectarian content in legislative invocations, provided the prayer opportunity has 
not been exploited to proselytize or advance a single religion, or to disparage any 
other,or that an impermissible motive has not been evinced by the selection of 
the prayer-giver 
 
This Court in Marsh set forth that the prayer content may not be parsed, and that 
sectarian content is not itself sufficient to violate the Establishment Clause where there is no 
evidence that the prayer opportunity has been exploited. See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792, 794-95. 
This standard permits a wide range of constitutionally acceptable prayers that may be offered in 
a legislative invocation scheme, including those that include sectarian references. Pelphrey v. 
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Cobb Cnty., 547 F.3d 1263, 1273 (11th Cir. 2008). Indeed, many courts, including the Second 
Circuit in Galloway, have acknowledged that Marsh did not prohibit sectarian content in 
legislative invocations. Galloway, 681 F.3d at 32-34; Pelphrey, 547 F.3d at 1270-71. The 
confusion regarding this Court’s stance on sectarian content in Marsh stems, not from the body 
of the majority opinion, but solely from a footnote mentioning that the prayer-giver had removed 
references to Christ after 1980. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 793, n.14. This fact was evidently not 
material to this Court’s decision, as this Court considered and took no umbrage with our Nation’s 
lengthy history of legislative invocations including sectarian references. Id. at 792. Further, Chief 
Justice Burger’s majority opinion does not limit the scope of the Court’s inquest to the period 
after 1980, but considers the duration of the prayer-giver’s 16-year appointment and from the 
inception of the prayer practice itself. Rubin v. City of Lancaster, 710 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir. 
2013) cert. denied before judgment, 134 S. Ct. 284 (2013). Satisfied that sectarian content alone 
was insufficient to satisfy a violation of the Establishment Clause, this Court stated with 
certainty that no evidence existed to suggest that the prayers before the Nebraska State 
Legislature served to advance, proselytize, or disparage religion. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 795. 
In addressing the subject of the prayer-giver selection process, this Court was equally 
exacting in determining that the Presbyterian minister’s continued reappointment over his 16-
year tenure as Nebraska’s legislative prayer-giver did not arise from any impermissible motive. 
Marsh, 463 U.S. at 793-94. Rather, the minister’s reappointment was due to his exceptional 
performance at the post. Rubin, 710 F.3d at 1112.Without proof of an impermissible motive in 
selecting the prayer-giver, this Court reasoned that the appointment of a Presbyterian, an 
adherent to a religion that is itself a sect within a sect of Protestant Christianity, did not arise to 
an impermissible motive in violation of the Establishment Clause. Id.; cf. Engel v. Vitale, 370 
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U.S. 421, 428 (1962) (remarking upon the diversity of faiths even within Christianity). 
B. The Second Circuit in Galloway created an inappropriately more expansive 
guideline by parsing the content and examining the contextual effects of the 
invocations to determine whether a prayer practice had created the appearance 
of an official establishment of religion 
 
In Galloway, the Second Circuit went to lengths to create a more articulated inquiry into 
the peculiarities of a legislative invocation practice in its totality by embarking on an inquiry into 
the prayer-giver selection process, the content of the prayers, and the contextual actions of the 
prayer-givers and board members with regard to the prayers. Galloway, 681 F.3d at 30. The 
court considered this examination to be within the ambit of the Supreme Court’s edict in Marsh, 
while viewing this more expansive investigation as a study of the prayer practice in the totality of 
circumstances as it would appear to a reasonable observer. Id. at 30, 32. Other circuits have 
applied similar tests while arriving at divergent, if not contradictory results. Compare Joyner v. 
Forsyth Cnty., 653 F.3d 341, 353-55 (4th Cir. 2011) (considering the entirety of the practice and 
determining that sectarian prayer content does amount to an advancement of religion); with 
Pelphrey, 547 F.3d at 1277–78 (examining three factors of the invocation practice, including 
prayer content, and determining the sectarian content of the invocations does not amount to 
advancement of religion). At odds with this standard, this Court in Marsh laid out a purposefully 
narrow and limiting prerequisite threshold to determine when the judiciary could begin to 
examine the very circumstances the “totality” inquiry seeks to probe at the starting point of its 
investigation.  Rubin, 710 F.3d at 1095-96. There must be evidence that the prayer practice has 
been exploited to proselytize or advance a single religion, or to disparage any other before the 
court can begin to parse the content of the invocations. Doe v. Tangipahoa Parish Sch. Bd., 631 
F. Supp. 2d 823, 839-40 (E.D. La. 2009). 
Likewise, an impermissible motive cannot be revealed solely by the predominantly 
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Christian identity of the prayer-giver(s); otherwise the practice held constitutional in Marsh 
would have been found unconstitutional. Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 159 F.3d 1227, 1247 
(10th Cir. 1998). Evidence of an impermissible motive seems to require more affirmative and 
prejudicial steps taken by the legislative body or its agents to ensure the persistence of a given 
sectarian view. Cf. Pelphrey, 547 F.3d at 1281 (determining the Planning Commission of Cobb 
County had ensured a Christian viewpoint in a rotating scheme of various legislative prayer-
givers by striking the names and religious congregations that did not comport with their own 
views). No such affirmatively prejudicial steps were taken in the prayer practice of either Marsh 
or Galloway, yet the Second Circuit still saw fit to rule the selection process unconstitutional 
merely because the local legislature solicited volunteer prayer-givers from within the confines of 
the town in which they governed. Galloway, 681 F.3d at 30-31. This conclusion is inescapably 
problematic because a city cannot dictate which religious congregations are allowed to settle 
within its limits. Rubin, 710 F.3d at 1099. If the Galloway standard requires, as it appears, that a 
selection process pull from a broad diversity of faiths, any local legislature could be made to 
solicit volunteers beyond its sphere of control in the event local that religious demographics 
violate this diversity requirement. Cf. Joyner, 653 F.3d at 354 (declining to consider the limited 
religious demographic argument). Such a requirement would be unduly harsh and contrary to the 
decision in Marsh where diversity of faiths represented was not required, regardless of local 
religious demographics. Rubin, at 710 F.3d at 1098; Marsh, 463 U.S. at 793-94. 
C. A legislative body or other public authority may not control the content of an 
invocation or prohibit the speaker from using sectarian content, nor may a 
legislative body coerce attendees into participating in religious observance 
 
Part of this Court’s rationale in Marsh for requiring such a narrow inquiry into the prayer 
practice arose from concern over the extent of government’s authority to dictate the content of 
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the legislative prayer. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 798 (Brennan, W., dissenting); see generally Lee v. 
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 601 (1992) (stressing the necessity of keeping legislative invocations 
free of governmental control). In Lee, this Court did not equivocate on matters concerning 
government’s role in controlling the content of the legislative invocations. Id. at 600-602; see 
also Engel, 370 U.S. at 428 (concluding that the Establishment Clause forbids governmental 
authorship concerning the content of legislative invocations). It is important to note that this 
Court did not conclude that chaplain had removed those sectarian references at the express 
command of the legislative body. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 793, fn. 14. Lee states in explicit terms that 
the government may not impose a non-sectarian requirement upon the legislative prayer-givers. 
505 U.S. at 588; see also Galloway, 681 F.3d at 29 (following the decision in Lee, requiring a 
nonsectarian standard in the prayer practice would have the effect of establishing a national civic 
religion or vague theism, which would violate the Establishment Clause). 
Moreover, this Court was concerned in Lee with the risk of coercion particular to prayer 
exercises in a school setting. Lee, 505 U.S. at 592; see also Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. 
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 307 (1963) (recognizing the increased concern with regard to shielding 
the impressionable conscience of school children from the effects of subtle coercive pressures 
stemming from religious observance). This concern is distinct with regard to the school setting, 
as opposed to a legislative environment, as in Marsh, where the adult attendees would be free to 
come and go as their conscience dictates. Lee, 505 U.S. at 593, 597. Galloway ignores this 
distinction in considering the contextual actions and effects of the legislative prayer practice on a 
reasonable objective observer, and arrives at a conclusion that essentially finds rational, able-
minded adults effectively incapable of excusing themselves to the dictates of their conscience 
during moments of legislative invocation. Galloway, 681 F.3d at 32-33. This conclusion sells 
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short the intellectual capacity and individuality of adults attending a legislative session, prepared 
to engage in the noble and high-minded activities of politics and governance. Cf. Marsh, 463 
U.S. at 792 (noting that adults can participate in civic exercise without concern that they may be 
indoctrinated as a result of pious observances made in their presence). For this reason, 
Galloway’s inquiry into the contextual actions and effects of the legislative prayer practice on the 
objective observer, an analysis not permitted by this Court in Marsh, represents an overly broad 
and expansive examination of the legislative prayer practice. See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 815 
(Brennan, W., dissenting) (acknowledging this Court’s decision not to consider the effects of 
prayer practice on the detached observer). 
D. Public policy considerations are best addressed by the continued application of 
the legal standard established by this Court in Marsh 
 
The Second Circuit concedes the difficulty of overcoming the test it established by 
offering an ominous statement that effectively discourages local legislatures from embracing any 
legislative prayer practice. Galloway, 681 F.3d at 33. This conclusion is directly at odds with the 
historical analysis provided by this Court in Marsh. 463 U.S. at 786-93. The history of legislative 
invocations, including those invocations featuring stray sectarian references, is embedded in the 
fabric of our sociopolitical identity. Id. at 786. Further, requiring full diversity in the selection of 
prayer-givers presents a different set of policy concerns because a legislative body is simply at 
the mercy of its jurisdiction’s religious demographics, and is unable to ensure complete diversity 
as a matter of practicality. See generally Rubin 710 F.3d at 1098 (remarking on the unavoidable 
effect of religious demographics on efforts to ensure a diverse representation of beliefs). 
II. MARTIN COUNTY’S LEGISLATIVE INVOCATION PRACTICE DOES NOT VIOLATE THE 
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
 
The prayer practice in Martin County is sufficiently within the ambit of the constitutional 
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inquiry established by this Court in Marsh because the prayer opportunity has not been 
exploited, and, therefore, does not violate the Establishment Clause. (R. at 10 & 18). Further, the 
prayer practice in Martin County does not feature an impermissible motive in the prayer-giver 
selection process. Id. Absent evidence of exploitation of the prayer practice or an impermissible 
motive, this Court has established that the content of the prayers should not be parsed and the 
prayer practice itself should be ruled constitutional. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792, 794-95. In the 
alternative, the prayer practice in Martin County, but for the misapplication of the standard by 
the Seventeenth Circuit in making an unwarranted inquiry into the specific content the contextual 
effects of the invocations, should satisfy the legal standard set forth by the Second Circuit in 
Galloway. Galloway, 681 F.3d at 30-31. 
A. Under Marsh, Martin County’s legislative prayer practice is constitutional 
because the prayer opportunity has not been exploited to proselytize or advance 
a single religion, or to disparage any other, and there is no impermissible motive 
in the selection process 
 
In Marsh this Court established that a prayer practice is not subject to judicial scrutiny 
unless it can be shown that the prayer opportunity has been exploited to proselytize or advance a 
single religion, or to disparage any other, or that an impermissible motive could be found in the 
prayer-giver selection process. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 784. Rather than creating a bright line rule, 
this standard constructs a minimum threshold requirement that must be reached before the 
content of the legislative invocations can be examined. Tangipahoa, 631 F. Supp. 2d at 839-40. 
In order for the content to be parsed, or for the selection process to be examined, Dhaliwal must 
first show that the prayer opportunity has been exploited, or that an impermissible motive exists 
in the prayer-giver selection process. Id. Dhaliwal has not met this threshold in order for this 
Court to scrutinize the prayer content, therefore the content of the Martin County invocations and 
the contextual effects are immaterial and the prayers cannot be parsed. (R. at 19-20).  
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It is also essential to note that this Court in Marsh did not create a legal basis to establish 
a frequency-based limitation to determine whether any set amount of sectarian references would 
amount to an advancement of religion. See Joyner, 653 F.3d 341 (analyzing frequent and 
pervasive references to Christ in the invocations). A frequency-based test sets the judiciary on a 
doomed expedition into the content of the invocations because, absent evidence that the prayer 
opportunity has been exploited to proselytize or advance a single religion, or to disparage any 
other, this Court should remain unconcerned with mere references to sectarian aspects of religion 
or the contextual effects of the prayer practice in Martin County. See, e.g., Pelphrey, 547 F.3d 
1263 (concluding that this Court in Marsh permits sectarian content because parsing the content 
is prohibited absent evidence that the prayer opportunity has been exploited); Simpson v. 
Chesterfield Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 404 F.3d 276, 284 (4th Cir. 2005) (determining that 
numerous sectarian references alone do not amount to an exploitation of the prayer opportunity).  
As opposed to the mere frequency of sectarian references, this Court should consider 
whether the local legislature has taken any affirmative steps to affiliate the legislature or its 
jurisdiction with Christianity. Rubin, 710 F.3d at 1097. In so doing, this Court should find that 
Martin County has not taken any affirmative steps to affiliate the county with any religion 
because Martin County employs a neutral and inclusive selection process, where prayer-givers 
are volunteer participants. (R. at 10).  In comparison to the prayer practice and prayer-giver 
selection process considered in Marsh, the prayer practice and selection process in Martin 
County is significantly more inclusive of diverse religious faiths. (R. at 16);  Marsh, 463 U.S. at 
793-94. As this Court deemed the prayer practice and selection process in Marsh to be within the 
bounds of constitutionality, it follows that this Court should also determine the prayer practice in 
Martin County to be constitutional. Marsh, 463 U.S. 783. 
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B. Alternatively, Martin County’s prayer practice should still be constitutional 
under the totality of circumstances standard employed in Galloway, provided the 
inquiry is limited to the threshold requirement established in Marsh  
 
Without reaching the baseline requirement for scrutiny under Marsh, the Galloway 
standard calls for an inquiry into the totality of circumstances of a legislative prayer practice, 
including the prayer-giver selection process, the specific content of the invocations, and the 
contextual effects of the actions of prayer-givers and board members upon a reasonable observer. 
Galloway, 681 F.3d at 30. If the Galloway inquiry is limited to the threshold requirement 
established in Marsh, this Court should be able to determine Martin County’s prayer practice 
constitutional because the there is no evidence that the threshold requirement set by Marsh has 
been met. Rubin, 710 F.3d at 1095-96. Without meeting the threshold requirement, the content of 
the prayers, the selection process, and the contextual effects in Martin County cannot be 
subjected to rigorous judicial scrutiny. Id. There is no impermissible motive in Martin County’s 
prayer-giver selection process because the prayer-givers are unrestricted volunteers who 
participate by self-selection, nor has Martin County attempted to exploit the prayer process by 
advancing, proselytizing, or disparaging any religion. (R. at 10 & 18). With regard to the effects 
upon a reasonable observer, it is important to note that such an observer must be cognizant of our 
Nation’s unique history of legislative prayer; therefore, such an observer should be aware that 
Martin County’s practice is well within our national tradition of solemnizing public occasions. 
See, e.g., Capitol Square Rev. and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 779-80 (1995) 
(considering the knowledge possessed by a reasonable observer); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 693 
(considering the benefits of solemnizing public occasions); Marsh, 463 U.S. at 791 (considering 
our Nation’s unique history of legislative prayer). It is evident that the Seventeenth Circuit 
simply misapplied the Galloway standard by parsing the content and considering other aspects of 
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the practice from the outset, and, but for this misapplication, it stands to reason that the Martin 
County invocations should be within the sphere of permissible legislative prayers. (R. at 28-29). 
C. The Board in Martin County is not required to exercise any control over the 
content of the legislative invocations, nor does the prayer practice coerce 
attendees into participating in a religious ceremony 
 
The prayer-givers and their invocations in Martin County have been entirely free from 
control or restriction on the part of the local legislature. (R. at 10 & 18). This practice is 
consistent with this Court’s ruling in Lee, where this Court made clear that government is 
prohibited from exerting control over the content of the invocations, even to restrict the 
invocations to nonsectarian content. Lee, 505 U.S. at 588; See also Engel, 370 U.S. at 425 
(declaring that government has no place in composing prayer content). Therefore, it cannot be 
expected for Martin County to control or restrict the prayer-givers from speaking according to 
the dictates of the prayer-giver’s own conscience. Rubin, 710 F.3d at 1089. 
Moreover, the presence of sectarian references delivered by an individual prayer-giver at 
the fore of a legislative session does not amount to an attempt at coercing attendees into 
participating in any religion or its exercise. See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792 (noting that attendees of 
a legislative session are not presumed to be susceptible to religious indoctrination or peer 
pressure); see also Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573, 600 (1989) 
(noting that legislative prayer does not necessarily urge attendees to engage in religious practice). 
Sectarian invocations are still within the permissible range of language permitted by Marsh. See 
Turner v. City Council of City of Fredericksburg, Va., 534, 536 F.3d 352 (4th Cir. 2008) (noting 
that prayers in Marsh included sectarian references and were still within the permissible range). 
Therefore, there can be no coercion because the attendees at the Martin County legislative 
sessions are free to come and go as they please, and are certainly able to excuse themselves from 
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participating in the invocations as their own consciences dictate. (R. at10 & 18).   
CONCLUSION 
 As established by this Court in Marsh, the minimum threshold requirements to begin 
determining whether a prayer practice has violated the Establishment Clause are: 1) whether 
Martin County has exploited the prayer opportunity; and 2) whether an impermissible motive is 
present in the selection process. Due to Dhaliwal’s inability to meet this threshold, this Court, 
consistent with its ruling in Marsh, should uphold that parsing the content of the invocations is 
prohibited, and that this Court should not consider the contextual effects of the practice. Martin 
County has neither coerced the attendees of its legislative sessions into participating in religious 
observance, nor has Martin County censored the content of the invocations or prohibited anyone 
from participating in the delivery of the invocations, Dhaliwal included. As a result, this Court 
should uphold the constitutionality of Martin County’s legislative prayer practice. Further, this 
Court should find that Martin County’s prayer practice is entirely consistent with our Nation’s 
unique history of legislative prayer as discussed in this Court’s historical analysis in Marsh. 
Nevertheless, should this Court consider the Martin County prayer practice in its totality, as 
outlined by the Second Circuit in Galloway, the inquiry should still be limited to the minimum 
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